Irannegbeh_3a_1.indd

arms-for-hostages. See Iran-Contra scandal assassinations of Iranian dissidents, 148 adaptability, as element of Iranian character, Ahmadinezhad, President, 8n3, 166n13, 170, awareness, of Iranian history and culture, 6, AIOC. See Anglo-Iranian Oil Company Azerbaijan crisis (1945–47), 7, 35–57, 158 oil concessions law and, 38, 41, 50, 52, Soviet involvement in, 39–40, 40n6, 42, 43 Algerian mediation, during hostage crisis, Algiers accord (1975), 144, 145Algiers accord (1981), 143n41 bahar-e-azadi (spring of freedom), 95 Bani Sadr, Abu Al-Hassan, 103, 104, 112, 113 Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC), 53, 59, BATNA (Best Alternatives to a Negotiated compensation for assets of, 72–74, 78–79, Bazargan, Mehdi, 49, 96, 99–101, 100n20. See also provisional government Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC), 60, 61, Anglo-Russian treaty (1907), 2n2, 37, 37n1, antiaircraft weapons, 128, 129–30, 132, 137 Bill, James, 11n7, 56, 71–72, 79, 80, 139 APOC (Anglo-Persian Oil Company), 60–61, British Persianists, 69–70. See also United Brzezinski, Zbigniew, 91, 97, 99n18, 100n20 long-term effects of, 81, 85–86, 87–88, 117, Bush, George H.W., 122, 139–40, 142–49 Bush, George W., 10, 154n1, 181, 189, 192 capitulations, versus concessions, 157n6 cultural openness, as element of Iranian cynicism, in Iranian political culture, 60, 81 refusal of shah’s visit, 97Tehran visit (1978), 90 Christopher, Warren, 115, 116, 118, 119, 135, CIA, Iran-Contra scandal and, 124, 125, 131 long-term effects of, 81, 85–86, 117, 157, 158, diplomatic relations (U.S.-Iranian), lack of, during oil nationalization crisis, 70–73, Iran-Control scandal and, 125–26, 134, 151 Documents from the U.S. Espionage Den, 104, Communist Party (Tudeh), 39, 42, 43, 49–50, “downward spiral,” 182, 182n7, 184, 188–89 concessions. See also oil concessions Constitutional Movement (1906–11), 35, embassy hostage crisis (1979–81), 8, 87–119 German intermediaries, in hostage crisis, Ghorbanifarr, Manouchehr, 124–39, 152, 161 Iranian political battles during, 103–04 long-term effects of, 87–88, 119, 151, U.S. negotiating stance, 107–09, 117–18 Eradeh-ye-Melli (National Will) party, 41 Hashemi-Rafsanjani, Ali Akbar, 114, 118, 140 1990 fake telephone call from, 122, 143, 151 Iran-Contra deals and, 136Lebanan hostages and, 123, 141–49 Hawk antiaircraft missiles, 128, 130, 131n20, Fisher, Roger, 4–5, 62–63, 68, 84, 97, 176n26 hezb-e-baad (party of the winds), 141, 170 on hostage negotiations, 5, 107–08, 108n28 Hezb-e Zahmatkeshan (Toilers’ Party), 64, 75 foreign innovations, Iranian adoption of, foreign relations, embassy hostage crisis importance of, 6, 12, 83, 117, 153, 157–60, U.S. embassy (See embassy hostage crisis) during oil nationalization crisis, 70–73, Iranian-Soviet treaty (1921), 37n1, 45, 53, 55, international opinion of Iran and, 175–76 U.S. admission of shah on, 98, 100n19, 100, Iraqi blame for, 145–48, 152, 159–60, 173, intelligence, crediting negotiators with, during embassy hostage crisis, 110–12, 110n30, 115–16, 119, 154, 160–61, 176 during Lebanon hostage crisis, 140, 141, during oil nationalization crisis, 68–73, 83, internecine battles during, 94–95, 102, Israel, Iran-Contra scandal and, 123–39 IranAir Airbus, 143, 143n41, 158, 188Iran-Contra scandal (1985–86), 8, 121, 123–39 Jebheh-ye-Melli. See National Front involvement of Reagan administration in, Jordan, Hamilton, 99, 110–11, 110n30, 119 jujeh-komunist (mini-commies), 102 justice, Iranian insistence on, 152, 169, 173–74 during oil nationalization crisis, 83–84 political misjudgments, 137U.S. goals during, 125–28, 138–39, 150–51 U.S.-Iranian relations preceding, 121–22 Iranian Communist Party (Tudeh), 39, 42, 43, Iranian dissidents, assassinations of, 148 Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Kavtaradze, Sergei, 38Kazemi-Qomi, Kazemi, 10 Kharrazi, Kamal, 144Khashoggi, Adnan, 124, 127 Khomeini, Ahmad, 102, 114n35, 113, 114, 135 elections law regarding foreign troops, 51 hostage negotiations, 103, 109, 111–14, support for embassy takeover, 101–02, 119 mard-e-rendi behavior, 103, 105, 138, 152, 167, Kish Island, Iran-Contra meetings at, 132–33 McFarlane, Robert, 124–26, 126n11, 134, 135, Medes, 19middle class, Islamic Revolution and, 95 on Iranian reaction to shah in U.S., 99, Miller, William Green, 89n2, 96n12, 102–03 on shah’s request to visit U.S., 97, 98 language, 11, 11n7, 20–21, 20n6, 24–25 lawlessness, climate of, 105, 105n24, 171 Mojahedin-e-Khalq Organization, 102, 104, Lebanon hostages, 8. See also Iran-Contra monarchy. See also Pahlavi shahs; specific releases of, 128, 134, 136, 143–44, 147–48 Ledeen, Michael, 126, 126n11, 128, 130, 132 leftist groups, embassy hostage crisis and, as center of oil nationalization crisis, coalition formed by (See National Front) national unity, Azerbaijan crisis and, 56 National Will (Eradeh-ye-Melli) party, 41 during oil nationalization crisis, 70–73, overthrow of, 32, 75–77, 75n30, 87, 117, 157, effect of history and culture on, 15–32, Moslem Student Followers of the Imam’s NIE (National Intelligence Estimate), 188 of U.S., during embassy hostage crisis, 99, Obama, Barack, 154n1, 194n23objective criteria, establishment of, 155–57, national character (Iranian), 6, 17–18, 23–25. U.S. view of, 9, 154n1, 155, 184–86, 190–91 National Front (Jebheh-ye-Melli), 63 1944 law concerning, 38, 41, 50, 53–55, 63 Soviet requests for, 38–40, 42, 46, 51, 61 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), 188 national interest, Iranian control of, 165–66 oil nationalization crisis (1951–53), 7, 59–84 nationalism, oil industry and. See oil lessons learned, 81–85long-term effects of, 59–60, 87 psychological side of, 62, 65–71, 83–85, political system (U.S.), Iranian confusion U.S. attempts to mediate in, 68, 71–74, pre-Islamic history, 17–18, 28, 30, 157, 170 pressure, degree of, 172pro-shah party, 49, 49n28 Pahlavi shahs. See also specific monarch inability to protect U.S. embassy, 2, 100 attempts to separate religion and politics, Iranian discontent with, 22–23, 23n11, 90 U.S. support for, 32, 44n15, 54n40, 89, 89n2, Persian language, 11, 11n7, 20–21, 20n6, involvement in Iran-Contra deals, 131–32, 138, 161 (See also Iran-Contra scandal) religion, 15–32. See also Shia Islam; specific tension between culture and, 29–30, 29n17 religious diversity, tradition of, 21, 21n7 responsibility, establishment of, 162–63 Revolutionary Council, 1n1, 93, 112, 163n10 Shia Islam. See also Twelver Shia Islam as element of Iranian identity, 16, 21, 24, Iranian dissatisfaction with, 22–23, 23n11 Slavin, Barbara, 10, 106, 148, 159n7, 192n20 controversy, 7, 32, 33n19, 81, 168, 168n18 during oil nationalization crisis, 70–73 Soviet-Iranian oil company, proposal for, 46, Soviet-Iranian treaty (1921), 37n1, 45, 53, 55, Anglo-Russian treaty (1907), 2n2, 37, 37n1, objectives in Iran, 42–43, 51oil concessions sought by, 38–40, 42, 43, Sadchikov, Ivan Vasilivich, 46, 48, 50, 53, 54 support for Azerbaijani separatists, 39–40, withdrawal from Iran, 41–43, 46, 50–51, WWII occupation of Iran, 36–41, 155, 157, spring of freedom (bahar-e-azadi), 94 Tudeh party, 39, 42, 43, 49–50, 49n29, 56, 76 controversy, 7, 32, 33n19, 81, 168, 168n18 stereotypes, 9, 154n1, 155, 184–88. See also during Islamic Revolution, 93–94, 105, Anglo-Russian treaty (1907), 2n2, 37, 37n1, Iranian view of, 66–69, 69n17, 71, 84–85 oil interests, 42 (See also Anglo-Iranian Oil Tabataba’i, Sadeq, 114, 115, 117, 119, 135 view of Iranians in, 62, 66–72, 84–85, 166, atmosphere in, during Islamic Revolution, Iran-Iraq cease-fire negotiations, 138–40, hostage crisis in (See embassy hostage theatrical element, in Iranian negotiating Resolution 598, Paragraph 6, 146–48, 152 Toilers’ Party (Hezb-e Zahmatkeshan), 64, 75 attempts to mediate in oil nationalization TOW antitank missiles, 128–29, 129, 132, 137 August 1953 coup and, 75, 81, 87, 157, 174, Anglo-Russian (1907), 2n2, 37, 37n1, 117, hostage crisis (See embassy hostage crisis) as Iranian enemy, 60, 81–82, 85–86, 87–88, Iranian-Soviet (1921), 37n1, 45, 53, 55, 155 tripartite (UK-USSR-Iran), 36, 39, 117, 155, Iranian view of, 9, 187–88, 187n12, 191–92 lack of formal diplomatic relations with pro-monarchy stance, 32, 44n15, 55n40, 89, World War I, invasion of Iran during, 32, 36 view of Iranians in, 87–88, 117, 121, 184–86 Allied occupation during, 32, 36–41, 117, Iranian political battles following, 41, 55 unorthodox ideas, 28–29Ury, William L., 62–63 Velayati, Ali Akbar, 123, 141, 142Venezuela, 61 victimization, Iranian sense of, 158–59

Source: http://bookstore.usip.org/resrcs/frontm/1601270437_index.pdf

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Hcicor-98.6. 461.464

Myotoxicity is a well known side-effect ofon medical errors:3 while the public views openstatins, with a reported incidence of 1–7%.3 Noreporting as a very effective way of reducing errors,cases of rhabdomyolysis due to monotherapyphysicians prefer confidentiality. We conducted awith ezetimibe have been described. However,survey to evaluate the potential contribution of adisclo

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